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BOOK REVIEW
WE HAVE NOTHING TO FEAR BUT GENDER
STEREOTYPES: OF KATIE AND AMY AND
"BABE FEMINISM"
THE MORNING AFTER: SEX, FEAR, AND FEMINISM ON CAMPUS. By Katie
Roiphe. Boston: Little, Brown & Co. 1993. 180 pp. $19.95.
LindaJ Laceyt
INTRODUGCION
(Girls' Chorus)
Tell me more, tell me more.
Was it love at first sight?
(Boys' Chorus)
Tell me more, tell me more.
Did she put up a fight?
(Girls' Chorus)
He got friendly, holding my hand.
(Boys' Chorus)
She got friendly, down in the sand.1
In The Morning After: Sex, Fear, and Feminism on Campus,2 Katie
Roiphe claims that feminists have gone too far in their "fascination"
with date rape, sexual harassment, and other forms of sexual oppres-
sion.3 She argues that feminists are chasing the same stereotypes their
mothers "fought so hard to get away from"4 by portraying women as
delicate victims and men as sexual predators. 5 In Roiphe's world,
overwrought fears of men and sex have created a victim culture. This
t Professor of Law, University of Tulsa College of Law; B.S., University of Wisconsin
Madison, 1967;J.D., UCLA School of Law, 1978. I would like to thank Larry Backer, Mari-
anne Blair, Judith Royster, and Susan Chase for their helpful comments.
1 JOHN TRAVOLTA & OLIVIA NEWTON-JoHN, Summer Nights, on THE OIGINAL SOmND-
TRACK FROM THE MOTION PICrURE GREASE (PolyGram International Records 1978) (used in
a scene in which a teenage boy and girl describe the same experience-their summer
romance-to a group of their peers).
2 KATIE ROIPHE, THE MORNING AFrTR: SEx, FEAR, AND FEMINISM ON CAMPUS (1993).
3 Id. at5.
4 Id. at6.
5 Id. at 64-65, 162.
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victim culture, not date rape or sexual harassment, poses the real
threat to women.6
Roiphe's book, which has made her the darling of antifeminist
conservatives and the media,7 reflects many of the conflicts and dilem-
mas of contemporary feminist jurisprudence. Although critics can
easily attack the text as presenting an exaggerated and inaccurate ver-
sion of feminism on campus,8 they cannot so easily vanquish its under-
lying ideas.9 When we strip away Roiphe's mixed messages, 10
6 Roiphe is one of several women authors making this argument. See, e.g., Camille
Paglia, Rape and Modern Sex War, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Jan. 27, 1991, reprinted in CAmiLE PAGLIA,
SEX, ART, AND AmEIucAN CULTURE 49 (1992); NAOMI WOLF, FnRE WIH FIRE: THE NEw FE-
MALE PowER AND How IT Win. CHANGE T 21sr CENTui" (1993).
7 Roiphe's book has been reviewed in almost every major newspaper and magazine,
unusual treatment for a first publication. See, e.g., Julie Phillips, Nothing to Fear but Fear
Itsef., WOMEN's REv. BooKS, Nov. 1993, at 6; Kio Stark, I'm OK, You're OK NATION,Jan. 31,
1994, at 137; Cathy Young, Boys Will Be Boys, WASH. Posr, Sept. 19, 1993, at X3. Addition-
ally, Roiphe has appeared on talk shows and was the subject of general interest news arti-
cles, including ajoint interview with the author and her mother. See Barbara P. Noble, At
Lunch with Katie and Anne Roiphe: One Daughter's Rebellion or Her Mother's Imprint?, N.Y.
TIMKs, Nov. 10, 1993, at CI; see also Susan Everley-Douze, Empoweing Victims: Tulsa Leaders
Dispute Claim That It's Weak To Speak Up, TuLsA WoRLDJan. 16, 1994, at Li; Mary Gaitskill,
On Not Being A Vitim, ,uw_''s, Mar. 1994, at 35; Kris Worrell, Feminists Book Questions
Backlash, TuLsA WORLD, Oct. 10, 1993, at L5.
The book was also the central focus of a Newsweek cover story that accepted most of
Roiphe's arguments at face value. Sarah Crichton, Sexual Crrectness: Has It Gone Too Far?,
NEWSWEEK, Oct. 25, 1993, at 52. The article, which was largely critical of feminist perspec-
tives on date rape, attempted to draw an analogy between "political correctness," a favorite
(if fictional) bane of the media, and concern about date rape. Id. at 52.
8 Not only is the book extremely skewed toward elite East Coast schools, which are
not typical college campuses, see infra note 12, but it presents a world in which all feminists
are dominance feminists. This simply does not accurately portray the increasingly
postmodern or liberal nature of feminist thought. See infra part VI. Additionally, in her
chapter on MacKinnon and pornography, RoiPHE, supra note 2, at 138-60, Roiphe com-
pletely ignores a number of prominent feminists who are critical of MacKinnon's work.
ROIPHE, supra note 2, at 138-60. See, e.g., Katharine T. Bartlett, MacKinnon s Feminism: Power
on Whose Terms?, 75 CAL. L. Rxv. 1559 (1987); Lucinda M. Finley, The Nature of Domination
and the Nature of Women: Reflecions on Feminism Unmodified, 82 Nw. U. L. REv. 352 (1988)
(book review).
9 The authors of a major casebook on women's legal issues considered Roiphe's
work significant enough to be included in its 1994 supplement. MAiR'JoE FRUG, WOMEN
AND THE LAw 75 (Supp. 1994).
10 The book represents an odd mixture of conservative criticism of feminism and radi-
cal notions of the joys of free sex. Roiphe also displays a strange denial of the reality of
violent crime that would be anathema to most "law and order" conservatives. For example,
she is highly critical of blue lights placed on the Princeton campus to help prevent rape,
claiming ihat they create a climate of fear- "blue means be afraid." ROiPHE, supra note 2,
at 28.
Roiphe herself has rejected any claim that the book is conservative: "The image of
women I'm talking about is women responsible for their own actions, who control their
own sexuality.... This isn't an image that is really going to appeal to Pat Buchanan."
Noble, supranote 7, at C6. Despite these disclaimers, Roiphe's sources in the book, such as
author David Mamet and sociologist Neil Gilbert, id. at 52-55, are conservative an-
tifeminists. RoIPHE, supra note 2, at 52-55, 105-07.
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meanspiritedness," and East Coast essentialism,' 2 three basic themes
emerge:
1. The only valid feminist goal' 3 is for women to be treated ex-
actly like men.14
2. Feminism depicts women as weak, passive victims. This por-
trayal reinforces stereotypes of women as Victorian virgins.15
3. Most of contemporary feminism, especially that focusing on
pornography, fosters an exaggerated fear of sex. This attitude takes
the "fun" out of sexual activity.16
Variations on these themes have become part of the critiques of
cultural and dominance feminism' 7 and have accompanied the
growth of postmodernism and the resurgence of liberalism in feminist
jurisprudence.' 8 Arguments that dominance feminists have created a
passive, delicate, and sexually fearful female subject are common. As
Kathryn Abrams demonstrates in her provocative book review,' 9
Roiphe's book is most obviously an attack on dominance feminism,
the school of feminist thought heavily influenced by Catharine MacK-
11 In her chapter entitled "The Mad Hatter's Tea Party," Roiphe provides extremely
nasty portraits of other graduate students, whom she depicts as either muddled thinkers
mindlessly following the "politically correct" line or hypocritical opportunists who choose
to be feminists because it is trendy. ROIPHE, supra note 2, at 113-37.
12 Every scene in the book takes place on the eastern campuses of Roiphe's experi-
ence. There is nothing wrong with describing the world one knows, but to suggest that this
world represents the larger world of college campuses is clearly erroneous. Roiphe por-
trays the vast majority of students as MacKinnon-influenced dominance feminists. This
certainly has not been my experience at the University of Tulsa, where the majority of
women students shy away from feminism in even its mildest liberal forms. I suspect my
experience is far more typical than Roiphe's. Eastern schools tend to be more liberal and
more influenced by feminism than are schools in other parts of the country.
Roiphe's false universalism is, perhaps, excusable-her book is openly anecdotal and
with a few exceptions does not pretend to rely on surveys or studies. It is far more troub-
ling when a "news" magazine like Newsweek picks up Roiphe's highly skewed description of
campus life and presents it as universal fact. The Newsweek article describing Roiphe's
book, contains phrases such as: "Like political correctness on campus, there's pitifully lit-
tle room for debate or diverse points of view." Crichton, supra note 7, at 52. This type of
statement assumes that all campuses are like Harvard and Princeton, a clearly inaccurate
world view.
13 Roiphe is uncompromising in her view that her brand of feminism is the only valid
one; she writes, "It is out of the deep belief that some feminisms are better than others that
I have written this book." ROIPHE, supra note 2, at 7.
14 See infra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
15 See infra notes 191-206 and accompanying text.
16 See infra notes 119-32 and accompanying text.
17 See infra notes 25-45 and accompanying text.
18 See infra notes 207-13 and accompanying text.
19 Kathryn Abrams, Songs of Innocence and Experience: Dominance Feminism in the Univer-
sity, 103 YALE LJ. 1533 (1994).
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innon,20 the contemporary feminist whose work Roiphe emphasizes.21
However, The Morning After can also be read as a critique of cultural,
or difference, feminism.
Roiphe's attack on feminist views of date rape and sexual harass-
ment implicitly rejects a concept central to cultural feminism: the be-
lief that significant cultural or psychological differences exist between
men and women.2 2 Additionally, her fears about gender stereotyping
echo current critiques of cultural feminism.23 Roiphe's "careless and
irresponsible" 24 work provides a concrete example of the dangers of
these criticisms carried to their ultimate extremes.
I
THE REnEAT FROM CULTURAL FEMINISM AND RoiPHE's
REJECrION OF GENDER DIFFERENCES
Carol Gilligan's In A Different Voice25 had an immediate and dra-
matic impact on feminist jurisprudence, helping to create the school
of feminist theory known as cultural feminism, which focuses on gen-
der differences. 26 Cultural feminists argue that women and men ex-
20 See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MAcKINNoN, FEmiIsM UNMODIFIED (1987) [hereinafter FEMI-
NISM UNMODIFIED]; CATHARINE A. MAcKONNoN, SExuAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN:
A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION (1979); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marrism, Method
and the State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS 635 (1983).
21 Roiphe devotes an entire chapter entitled "Catharine MacKinnon, the Antiporn
Star" to attacking MacKinnon. ROIPHE, supra note 2, at 138-60. Because the chapter con-
sists mainly of an examination of MacKinnon's speaking persona and a repeat of the Victo-
rian theme sounded elsewhere, I do not specifically discuss it in this Review. For a
discussion of the Victorian theme, see infra notes 191-206 and accompanying text.
22 See infra notes 25-45 and accompanying text.
23 See infra notes 191-206 and accompanying text. I do not wimt to imply that any of
the critics of cultural feminism actually share Roiphe's views on subjects such as date
rape--I am quite confident that most of them would find Roiphe's fundamental message
as offensive as I do.
24 Katha Pollitt, NotJust Bad Sex, NEw YORtER, Oct. 4, 1993, at 220-24.
25 CAROL GILLiGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WoMEN's DE-
vELoPMENT (1982). Gilligan's work is a study of the difference in the reasoning of boys and
girls, which suggests that boys' reasoning tends to be more hierarchical and girls' reason-
ing more relational and contextual. Id.
26 A partial list of works involving (or discussing) cultural feminism includes Judith
Areen, A Needfor Caring, 86 MICH. L. REv. 1067 (1988); Leslie Bender, Feminist (Re)Torts:
Thoughts on the Liability Crisis, Mass Torts, Power, and Responsibilities, 1990 DuKE LJ. 848;
Leslie Bender, From Gender Differences to Feminist Solidarity: Using Carol Cilligan and an Ethic
of Care in Law, 15 VT. L. REv. 1 (1990) [hereinafter Gender Differences]; Christine A. Lit-
tieton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 CAL. L. Rv. 1279 (1987); MariJ. Matsuda, Liberal
Jurisprudence and Abstracted Visions of Human Nature: A Feminist Critique of Rawls' Theory of
Justice, 16 N.M. L. REv. 613 (1986); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia in A Different Voice: Specu-
lations on a Women's Lawyering Process, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S LJ. 39 (1985); Suzanna Sherry,
Civic Vrirtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REv. 543 (1986);
Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CM. L REv. 1 (1988).
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perience society in significantly different ways.27 Using Gilligan's
study of children's problem-solving methods, they contend that men's
problem-solving tends to be hierarchical, while women's approach is
more relational and contextual.28 Men focus on a socially accepted
ethic of justice, according to cultural feminists, while women center
on an "ethic of care," which society has traditionally undervalued. 29
Cultural feminists believe that qualities associated with caregiving,
such as the ability to form and nurture relationships, deserve valida-
tion and celebration, instead of dismissal by a patriarchal society. One
commentator summarizes this theory as follows:
[M]any [cultural] feminists have argued that the important task for
feminists today is not to fit women into a man's world, not to assimi-
late women into patriarchy, and not to prove that women can func-
tion like men and meet male norms, but to change institutions to
reflect and accommodate the value that should properly be ac-
corded to characteristics and virtues traditionally associated with wo-
men, nurturing virtues such as love, sympathy, patience, and
concern.
3 0
Cultural feminists also claim that ostensibly gender-neutral laws
create only an illusion of equality because legal actors apply them in
ways that systematically disadvantage women.31 They call for decision-
making processes that ask "the woman question"-what impact will
this law have on women?32
27 As Martha Fineman puts it "Women's gendered existence is comprised of a variety
of experiences-material, psychological, physical, social, and cultural. Some of these ex-
periences may be described as biologically based, while others seem more rooted in culture
and custom." Martha L. Fineman, Challenging Law, Establishing Differences: The Future of
Feminist Legal Scholarship, 42 FLA. L. REv. 25, 37 (1990).
28 GILLGAN, supra note 25, at 6-29.
29 Id. at 6-39. Gilligan argues that psychologists have "[i]mplicitly adopt[ed] the male
life as the norm, they have tried to fashion women out of a masculine cloth." Id. at 6.
30 Another commentator gives a similar explanation of the goals of cultural feminism:
This strain of feminist theory has not merely celebrated values traditionally
associated with women. It has insisted that these values be valued and has
demanded changes in occupational structures, public places, and male atti-
tudes. The point has been not simply to celebrate women's experience but
to change men's to affect their conduct in work, family, and political
contexts.
DEBORAH L RHODE, JUsTIcE AND GENER: SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAw 309 (1989).
31 See, e.g., MARTHA L. FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQUALn=. THE RHETORIC AND REAL-
ry OF DIVORCE REFoRM (1991); Martha L Fineman, ImplementingEquality: Ideolog, Contra-
diction and Social Change: A Study of Rhetoric and Pursuits in the Regulation of the Consequences of
Divorce, 1983 Wis. L. REv. 789.
32 Heather Wishik breaks down this question into seven parts: (1) What experiences
of women are addressed by an area of the law? (2) What assumptions or descriptions of
that experience does the law make? (3) What is the area of distortion or denial so created?
(4) What patriarchal interests does the mismatch serve? (5) What reforms have been pro-
posed, and how will they affect women's interests both practically and ideologically? (6) In
an ideal world, how would women's situation look? (7) How do we get there from here?
616 [Vol. 80:612
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Gilligan-influenced feminism,3 3 known alternatively as different
voice feminism,3 4 difference feminism,3 5 relational feminism, 36 and
cultural feminism,3 7 became so widespread in the late 1980s that one
law review editor remarked that she had never seen an article on femi-
nist jurisprudence that did not mention Gilligan.38 It was inevitable
then, that this popular school of thought would have its critics3 9 and
would eventually endure a backlash. Today, critics of cultural femi-
nism far outnumber its proponents. 40
Critiques of cultural feminism fall into three broad categories:
1. Antiessentialism. Some critics attack cultural feminists for cre-
ating an "essential" woman who narrowly reflects only the experiences
of white, middle class feminists. 41
Heather R. Wishik, To Question Everything: The Inquiries of Feminist Jurisprudence, 1 BERKELY
WOMEN'S L.J. 64, 72-75 (1985).
33 Gilligan's work was also highly influential in other disciplines. See, e.g., KATHY E.
FERGUSON, THE FEMINST CASE AGAINST BURE.AUCRACY 159-60 (1984) (social theory); NEL
NODDINGS, CARING: A FEMIuNN APPROACH TO ETHICS AND MORAL EDUCATION 96 (1984)
(ethical theory); SHARON O'BRIEN, WIUA CATHER: THE EMERGING VOICE 57 n.25 (1987)
(literary criticism).
34 See Cass R. Sunstein, Feminism and Legal Theory, 101 HARv. L. REv. 826 (1988) (book
review).
35 See Patricia A. Cain, Feminism and the Limits of Equality, 24 GA. L. REv. 803 (1990).
36 See MARTHA MINOw, MAMNG ALL THE DurERENcE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION AND
AMEICAN LAw 219 (1990).
37 This is the terminology used by Robin West, supra note 26, perhaps the most influ-
ential (and criticized) cultural feminist, because it reflects the concept that gender based
differences are primarily shaped by cultural forces.
38 Joan C. Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH. L. REv. 797, 803 n.17 (1989).
Taunya Banks, in an article written at the height of Gililgan's popularity, referred ironically
to an "obligatory reference" to Gilligan. Taunya L. Banks, Gender Bias in The Classroom, 38
J. LEGAL EDUC. 137 n.1 (1988).
39 See, e.g., FEmNSM UNMODIFIED, supra note 20, at 38-39, 93-102; Patricia A. Cain,
Feminist Jurisprudence: Grounding the Theories, 4 BEmRxLEY WOMEN'S LJ. 191 (1989-90);
Drucilla Cornell, The Doubly-Prized World: Myth, Allegory and the Feminine, 75 CORNELL L
REv. 644 (1990); MaryJoe Frug, A Post Modem Feminist Legal Manifesto (An Unfinished Draft),
105 HARv. L. REV. 1045 (1992) [hereinafter Legal Manifesto]; Mary Joe Frug, Progressive
Feminist Legal Scholarship: Can We Claim "A Different Voice", 15 HARv. WOMEN'S LJ. 37
(1992) [hereinafter Different Voice]; Jeanne L. Schroeder, Abduction from the Seraglio: Femi-
nist Methodologies and the Logic of Imagination, 70 TEX. L. REv. 109 (1991) [hereinafter Abduc-
tion]; Jeanne L. Schroeder, Feminism Historcized: Medieval Misogynist Stereotypes in
Contemporary Feminist Jurisprudence, 75 IowA L. REv. 1135 (1990) [hereinafter Feminism His-
toriized]; Williams, supra note 38, at 798-822;Joan C. Williams, Dissolving the Sameness/lDffer-
ence Debate: A Post-Modern Path Beyond Essentialism in Feminist and Critical Race Theory, 1991
DUKE LJ. 296 [hereinafter Dissolving the Sameness/yifferenceDebate];Joan C. Williams, Gender
Wars: Selfless Women in the Republic of Choice 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1559 (1991) [hereinafter
Gender Wars].
40 Postmodern feminism, which began partially as a response to cultural feminism,
has become the predominant "voice" of feminist jurisprudence. See, e.g., Legal Manfesto,
supra note 39; Williams, supra note 38. Additionally, many feminists advocate a return to
liberalism. See infra notes 207-38 and accompanying text.
41 The major work in this area is EuzABETH SPELmAN, INESSENmSI WOMAN: PROBLEMS
OF EXCLUSION IN FEMINIST THOUGHT (1988). Although these criticisms are generally valid,
they tend to be somewhat essentialist themselves in their assertions that all cultural femi-
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2. Subordination theory. This criticism, articulated most strongly
by Catharine MacKinnon, argues that the subordination of women
created the different "voice" Gilligan describes and that by validating
it, women become collaborators in their own oppression.42
3. Stereotyping. Other critics charge that cultural feminism rein-
forces traditional conservative images of women.43 They contend that
an emphasis on women's positive qualities resembles the romantic pa-
ternalism of the Victorian era, which put women on a pedestal44 while
marginalizing them into a "separate sphere."45
Roiphe makes similar arguments in her book. Although she does
not explicitly discuss Gilligan's work, her writing is filled with affirma-
tions of liberal ideals 46 and diatribes against certain exaggerated as-
pects of cultural feminism.47 Roiphe is the ultimate answer to Joan
Williams's call for a "Gilligan in reverse."48
Like many feminists, Roiphe begins her book with a narrative49 of
sorts-a discussion of her own family background.50 She pictures her
grandmother as the classic victim of sexual stereotyping, a woman who
"missed" feminism.51 In contrast, her mother, the author Anne
Roiphe, was an early feminist 2 who refused to let her daughters watch
the Brady Bunch because she believed it was sexist and who taught
them that there was more to life than becoming a cheerleader.5
Roiphe describes herself as a young student who learned to speak her
own mind "instead of worrying what the boy in the third row might
nism is essentialist. According to Leslie Bender, "[B]ecause of preconceived notions in the
minds of hearers, ... many feminist difference theorists have been wrongly heard to make
authoritarian, universalist claims." Gender Differences, supra note 26, at 22.
42 FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 20, at 32-45. Although MacKinnon was among
the earliest critics of cultural feminism, this line of criticism appears to be losing ground to
the postmodern critique.
43 See, e.g., Different Voice, supra note 39, at 51-60; Abduction, supra note 39, at 124-41;
Williams, supra note 38, at 803-06.
44 The Supreme Court described romantic paternalism as "put[ting] women, not on a
pedestal, but in a cage." Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973) (plurality
opinion).
45 The cultural feminist stereotype most commonly attacked is that of woman as
mother. Joan Williams claims cultural feminists have created an "ideology of domesticity"
which, she contends, "encourages women to 'choose' economic marginalization and [to]
celebrate that choice as a badge of virtue." Williams, supra note 38, at 800, 801.
46 See infra notes 207-36 and accompanying text.
47 See infra notes 101-15 and accompanying text.
48 Williams, supra note 38, at 840.
49 Narratives are increasingly important in feminist jurisprudence. See Kathryn
Abrams, Hearing The Call of Stories, 79 CAL. L. REv. 971, 973 (1991).
50 ROIPHE, supra note 2, at 3-7.
51 Id. at 3.
52 Anne Roiphe is the author of the feminist novel ANNE R. ROIPHE, UP THE SA'aDBOXI
(1970). She is very supportive of her daughter's version of feminism. See Noble, supra note
7.
53 ROIPHE, supra note 2, at 4.
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think."54 With this background of independence and liberal feminist
ideals, the version of feminism Roiphe encountered at college sur-
prised and ultimately appalled her. The first time she attended a date
rape seminar, she felt
[t]his is not me, this has nothing to do with me. The naive female
victim in the film being shown was worlds away. Her fifties-style
dates were not the kind of dates my older sisters went on. She was
passive and innocent, and overly impressed by the boy's
intelligence. 5 5
Her mother's liberal feminism opened a world of possibilities for wo-
men; Roiphe believes modem feminism limits them.
In the rest of her book Roiphe provides examples of the "evils" of
contemporary feminism.56 Her targets include Take Back the Night
demonstrations, 57 pamphlets about campus dating and sex,58 the anti-
pornography movement,59 and, most significantly, the concepts of
date rape 60 and sexual harassment.61 Her narrative has two inconsis-
tent assumptions, which are tied together by her scorn for difference
theory.62 Roiphe primarily assumes that women are basically the same
as men, and that modem feminism has painted an inaccurate stere-
otypical view of women. Occasionally, however, she seems to acknowl-
edge that some differences do exist. She expresses contempt for these
differences and argues that women should strive toward male liberal
role models. Women should be tough, autonomous and thick
skinned, not passive and overly sensitive. This "Glint Eastwood" ap-
proach to feminism 63 permeates Roiphe's discussions of date rape and
54 Id. Despite this statement, Roiphe actually never had to worry about what any boys
might think-she and her sister attended private all-girls' schools.
55 Id. at 5.
56 To her credit, Roiphe acknowledges that her book is "not a scientific survey of
campus life, measuring the immeasurable with statistical certainty." Id. at 6-7. Neverthe-
less, her pattern of jumping from specific anecdotes to universal statements attempts to
create the impression that she has indeed provided an accurate depiction of all
universities.
57 Id. at 29-50.
58 Id. at 58-60.
59 Id. at 138-60. One of Roiphe's major themes in her section on pornography is that
the antipornography movement, and its chief proponent, Catharine MacKinnon, are really
conservative. Id. at 160. It is ironic that Roiphe, whose work has received acclaim from
conservative antifeminists, would make this claim. Both MacKinnon and Roiphe do have
unlikely supporters for their ideas, but the fact that some right-wing commentators ap-
prove of MacKinnon's and Roiphe's positions does not mean that either woman is
conservative.
60 Id. at 51-84. See infra notes 64-100 and accompanying text.
61 Id. at 85-112. See infra notes 131-61 and accompanying text.
62 Roiphe does not explicitly discuss difference theory as a strand of feminism; the
colleges she describes seem populated exclusively by dominance feminists. However, as I
have discussed, the reasoning of her attacks on various feminist theories about date rape
and sexual harassment resemble other authors' attacks on cultural feminism.
63 Abrams, supra note 19, at 1547-48.
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sexual harassment, both of which reflect an absolute denial of gender
differences.
II
ROIPHE ON DATE RAPE: IT'S ALL IN THEIR HEADS
Although Roiphe's discussion of date rape is so highly anecdotal
and muddled that it frustrates coherent analysis, it can be summarized
as containing three basic themes:
1. Reports of an "epidemic" of date rape are highly exaggerated;64
women lie about having been date raped. 65
2. Even women who tell the truth about their "rapes" are really just
describing bad sex.66
3. Women should not complain about bad sex and verbal
intimidation. 67
All three of these arguments can have concrete, real world results that
are highly detrimental to women. Roiphe's goal may have been a the-
oretical critique of feminist discussion of sex. However, her work will
contribute to further trivialization and underreporting of sex crimes
against women.
In her contention that reports and statistics about date rape are
inflated, Roiphe relies on rather dubious evidence. The figures can-
not possibly be true, she surmises, because "if 25 percent of my female
friends were really being raped, wouldn't I know it?"68 She also de-
scribes two women who lied about date rape,69 but offers no evidence
to indicate that they are anything other than a rare exception.70
In one of the rare parts of the book in which she attempts to rely
upon empirical evidence, Roiphe attacks the highly publicized date
rape study of psychologist Mary Koss.71 However, her critique is simply
a rehash of the arguments made by Berkeley professor Neil Gilbert,
who has conducted only limited, dated studies of his own, has never
64 ROIPHE, supra note 2, at 52-55.
65 Id. at 39-42, 81-82.
66 Id. at 79-81.
67 Id. at 67-69.
68 ROiPHE, supra note 2, at 52. Apart from the dubiousness of relying on one's per-
sonal experience to challenge empirical studies, there may be reasons why Roiphe's friends
may not want to discuss their experiences with her. Societal pressures have traditionally
silenced rape victims, and given the meanspiritedness Roiphe displays in discussing her
classmates, it is hard to imagine anyone wanting to confide in her.
69 Id. at 39-42.
70 Despite any evidence to the contrary, Roiphe apparently does believe that a large
number of women make up stories of rape at Take Back The Night demonstrations. Her
strong hostility toward these demonstrations prompts her to write: "It's impossible to tell
how many of these stories are authentic, faithful accounts of what actually happened. They
all sound tinny, staged." Id. at 42.
71 Id. at 51-55.
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talked -to rape victims, and whose bias against feminist work in the
field is well established. 72 All studies about rape are necessarily open
to some scrutiny and criticism because of limited data and differing
definitions of rape. However, Roiphe relies exclusively on Gilbert's
work without even attempting a fair survey of other available statistics.
Even Newsweek magazine, in an article highly sympathetic to Roiphe's
perspective, states "even the most conservative numbers are horrify-
ing."73 According to the study Newsweek cited, 13% of adult women
are victims of forcible rape.7 4 A 1990 government-financed study esti-
mated that at least 12.1 million women have been the victims of rape
at least once in their lives.75 Of these women, only 22% were raped by
strangers; 29% were attacked by non-relatives known to the victim, 9%
by a boyfriend or former boyfriend, and 9% by a husband or former
husband. 76
Roiphe's second argument, that too many women confuse bad
sex with date rape, is the one most quoted by the media. She writes:
People have asked me if I have ever been date-raped. And thinking
back on complicated nights, on too many glasses of wine, on strange
and familiar beds, I would have to say yes. With such a sweeping
definition of rape, I wonder how many people there are, male or
female, who haven't been date-raped at one point or another.77
At this point, Roiphe is committing exactly the same error of
which she accuses feminists-blurring the distinction between the
legal definition of rape and rape as a metaphor.78 The sweeping defi-
nition of date rape she refers to includes "verbal coercion" or "a
woman's consenting to unwanted sexual activity because of a man's
verbal arguments not including verbal threats of force."79 No criminal
72 Sharon Johnson, Rape: The Conservative Backlash, MS, Mar.-Apr. 1992, at 88; Lynne
Henderson, Rape and Responsibility, 11 LAw & PHIL 127, 160-62 (1992). Henderson notes
that Gilbert refuses to accept a woman's viewpoint of rape and views coercive behavior as
normal and "romantic." Id. at 160-62.
73 Crichton, supra note 7, at 56. The article uses statistics from NATIONAL Vcrim
CENTER & THE CRiMu VICrMS RESEARCH AND TEATMENT CENR, MEDiCAL UIvERsrIy OF
SouTH CAROLINA, RAPE IN AMERICA: REPORT TO THE NATION 6 (1992) [hereinafter NA-
TIONALVICTIM CENTE SURVEY], which shows that 16- to 24-year-olds are a particularly high-
risk group. Id.
74 Id.
75 David Johnson, Survey Shows Number of Rapes Far Higher Than Offiial Figures, N.Y.
Tirms, Apr. 24, 1992, at A14. The article reports statistics gathered by the National Wo-
men's Study. The study was limited to adult women and therefore was estimated to cover
less than half of actual rapes. Id (reporting on the survey cited supra note 73).
76 Id.
77 Roi'sHE, supra note 2, at 79.
78 Id. at 70-76.
79 Id. at 67. Although Roiphe makes it sound like this definition is universally ac-
cepted, she can give only one cite for it-AcQuAnrrANcE RAPE: THE HIDDEN CRIME (An-
drea Parroot & Laurie Bechofer eds., 1990). This apparently deliberate
mischaracterization of the facts is another example of Roiphe's tendency to make authori-
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statute or court has officially adopted this definition, and none is
likely to adopt it in the future.80
Throughout the date rape chapter, Roiphe confuses instances in
which feminists and the characters she quotes compare their exper-
iences to rape and instances in which they actually file an official
claim that the crime of rape has occurred. According to a recent
study, approximately 84% of all rapes go unreported.81 This statistic
illustrates the absurdity of Roiphe's assumption that women "cry
rape"8 2 whenever they experience bad sex. Even when false reports
are filed, given the lack of willingness of prosecutors to try date rape
cases,83 it is unlikely that any one who has simply experienced "bad
sex" would have her experience converted into a rape trial.8 4
Roiphe demonstrates her distorted view of the universe of femi-
nism by implying that nearly all feminists blur the line between bad
sex and rape.85 She ignores voices like that of Robin West, one of the
most prominent cultural feminists, who states that "[tihere is a fine
line between the feeling of being threatened by an implied threat of
tative statements based on a single, highly dubious source. Roiphe also discusses a New
Jersey case, State ex rel., 609 A.2d 1266 (N.J. 1992), which she characterizes as adopting
feminist definitions of rape. However, while that case did hold that a threat of physical
force was not an indispensable element of rape under its statute's definition, it did not
adopt the view that verbal coercion constitutes rape. Id. at 1276.
80 This distortion of the actual law pervades Roiphe's book. It may seem unfair to
criticize an English graduate student for not being a lawyer, but Roiphe discusses the law in
such authoritative tones that her inaccurate statements will provide false information to
other layperson readers.
81 See NATIONAL VIcIM CENTER SURVEY, supra note 73, at 6.
82 RoIPHE, supra note 2, at 79-84. The clich6 thatwomen falsely "cry rape" for revenge
or other illegitimate reasons has ancient roots. In 1778, Sir Matthew Hale, Lord Chief
Justice of the Court of the King's Bench, described rape as "an accusation easily to be made
and hard to be proved, and harder to be defended by the party accused tho never so
innocent." Patricia Lopez, He Said... She Said... An Overview of Date Rape From Commission
Through Prosecution Through Verdict, 13 CuM.Jusr.J. 275, 285 (1992). Roiphe reinforces it
with her statement that "we threaten to confirm the vision of that eighteenth-century patri-
arch Henry Fielding when he writes, 'These words of exclamation, (murderl robberyl
rapel) are used by ladies in a fright as fa la la da sa are in music only as vehicles of sound
and without any fixed idea.'" ROIPHE, supra note 2, at 81 (quoting HENRY FiELDrG, TOM
JONEs 471 (Penguin Books 1966) (1749)).
83 See, e.g., Susan Estrich, Real Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1107-08 (1986); Henderson,
supra note 72, at 128-29.
84 Over 40% of reported rapes are dismissed by prosecutors. STAFF OF SENATE COMM.
ON THEJUrDICIARY, 103d Cong., 2d Sess., THE RESPONSE TO RAPE: DETouRs ON THE ROAD TO
EQUAL JUSTICE (Comm. Print 1993). Even more startlingly, over half of all rape prosecu-
tions are dismissed before trial or result in acquittal and over a quarter of convicted rapists
never go to prison. Id.
85 Roiphe states authoritatively, "'Rape' becomes a catchall expression, a word used to
define everything that is unpleasant and disturbing about relations between the sexes."
RoiPHE, supra note 2, at 80. Later in the same chapter, she does acknowledge that a "few
feminists" object to blurring definitions of rape, but she fails to discuss the work of the
most influential feminist authors who take this position. Id- at 81-82.
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force and the feeling of the sheer inevitability of sex. Nevertheless,
they are... distinctly different experiences."8 6
If Roiphe's primary point is that rape is a dangerous metaphor
for feminists to use, she does raise a valid concern. Many unsympa-
thetic members of the public already believe that feminists go too far
in their definition of rape. I often have male students tell me with
absolute authority that Catharine MacKinnon thinks all heterosexual
intercourse is rape. When I try to explain that this characterization is
an exaggerated summary of MacKinnon's views, they refuse to believe
me. Nevertheless, feminists are not the only ones using rape as a met-
aphor-people whose houses are broken into often describe their ex-
perience as feeling like being raped. A Harvard professor even
reacted to being criticized for racial insensitivity by saying, "I felt like a
rape victim."8 7
Roiphe claims that "It]here is a gray area in which someone's
rape may be another person's bad night"88 but the real ambiguity in
sexual encounters8 9 is not due to women who cannot tell the differ-
ence between bad sex and rape. Instead, it is created by gender differ-
ences in perceptions about consent A number of commentators have
noted that in dating situations the man is likely to believe the woman
is consenting when she is not 90 I am constantly amazed in my crimi-
nal law class at the willingness of most of my male students to find
consent in the most unlikely situations, including a case in which a
gynecologist forced sexual intercourse on a seventeen-year-old who
was receiving her first medical examination. 91 Men raised on the "no
means yes" myth may perceive a woman who is resisting as one just
playing games. For example, one study of undergraduates showed
that while almost 60% of the females surveyed disagreed with the
statement "When it comes to sex, females say no but really mean yes,"
86 Robin West, The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenological Critique of
Feminist Legal Theory, 3 Wis. WOMEN'S LJ. 81, 103 (1987).
87 Randall Kennedy, The Political Correctness Scare; 37 Loy. L. REv. 231, 240 (1991)
(quoting remarks made by Steven A. Themstrom).
88 ROIPHE, supra note 2, at 54.
89 Author Mary Gaitskill gives a more sensitive description of the ambiguity in sexual
situations, and unlike Roiphe, she is willing to provide a concrete example of her own
experience of a "bad night." Gaitskill, supra note 7, at 35-36. Gaitskill reports of her own
experience that although she felt raped, she "would not have lied.., in court or in any
other context that might have had practical consequences; it didn't even occur to me to
take my case to court." Id at 36.
90 For a thorough discussion of this problem, see Douglas N. Husak & George C.
Thomas, II, Date Rape, Social Convention, and Reasonable Mistakes, 11 LAw & PHIL 95 (1992).
91 People v. Borak, 301 N.E.2d 1 (Ill. 1973). Many male students agreed with the
majority opinion that because the woman did not struggle or cry out, she had consented.
Most of my woman students understood that the teenager was undoubtedly too scared or
amazed to resist.
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only 27% of the men disagreed.92 Less than 33% of the male students
questioned disagreed with the statement, "For some females, physical
aggressiveness by the male is a necessary prelude to the acceptance of
love and affection."93
Gender disparity in attitudes raises the question of what mental
state a man must have to commit the crime of rape. Commentators
far more familiar with rape law than Roiphe have debated this ques-
tion. Susan Estrich proposes a reasonable man standard, with negli-
gence as the mens rea.94 In contrast, Lynne Henderson takes a
cultural feminist approach which acknowledges the differences be-
tween men and women.95 She recognizes that a woman may think it
reasonable to invite a man to her house without that action signaling
consent, while a man may consider the invitation automatic acquies-
cence to sexual intercourse. 96
Although Roiphe may have raised legitimate issues of "gray" areas
regarding date rape,97 she seems to assume that the very existence of
these gray areas means the crime should not be taken seriously. But
every area of the law has "gray areas";98 ambiguity is inevitable in so
personal a situation and is not a reason to abolish recognition of the
crime. Most of the date rape situations actually prosecuted are rela-
92 See R. Thomas Dull & DavidJ. Giacopassi, Demographic Correlates of Sexual and Dating
Attitudes: A Study of Date Rap4 14 CRiM. JUST. & BEHAv. 175, 183 (1987). The fact that over
40% of college women agreed with the statement is troubling evidence of the pervasiveness
of the "no means yes" myth, even among its prospective victims.
93 1d. at 188.
94 SusAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 95-98 (1987).
95 Lynne Henderson, Review Essay, What Makes Rape a Crime?, 3 BERELE =WoMEN'sLj.
193 (1987).
96 Id. at 217. Henderson also proposes a system of mitigated, middle, and aggravated
rape sentencing. Henderson, supra note 72, at 176.
97 ROrPHE, supra note 2, at 54. Another issue which Roiphe discusses briefly, but su-
perficially, is the situation when a woman voluntarily becomes intoxicated prior to inter-
course. In criticizing a questionnaire in which women were asked about unwanted
intercourse after a man had given them alcohol or drugs, Roiphe asks, with some validity,
'Why aren't college women responsible for their own intake of alcohol or drugs?" RorPHE,
supra note 2, at 53. One answer may be that sometimes men lie to inexperienced drinkers
about the strength of their drinks, but such incidents are probably relatively rare. However,
Roiphe's statement that women should be responsible for their own choices to drink or
take drugs dodges the harder question: At what point is a woman so intoxicated that she
can no longer be considered as giving her consent to sexual intercourse? Most people,
with the possible exception of Roiphe, would agree that a man commits rape when he has
intercourse with a woman who is passed out and completely unconscious. But see Mike
Litwin, Killing a Cheating Wife is Understandable, TuLSA WoRLD, Oct. 23, 1994, at 02. (discuss-
ing case where ajudge said that finding a woman drunk and passed out in his bed was "the
dream of a lot of men"). But what about a situation where a man is aware that a woman is
conscious, but very intoxicated? Roiphe is correct in stating that the expansion of rape
prosecutions to situations where the parties are acquaintances raises difficult questions,
and it is quite possible that there will never be universal agreement on their answers.
98 In criminal law, for example, the boundaries of self-defense are notoriously diffi-
cult to ascertain. See, e.g., WAYNE R. IAFAvE, CRIMiNAL Lw § 5.7 (2d ed. 1986).
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tively unambiguous. Roiphe ignores the easy cases in her zeal to con-
demn the hard ones.
Perhaps the greatest harm of Roiphe's oversimplified attack on
date rape is that it allows men to continue to validate their behavior
and their refusal to take rape seriously. As long as male law students
snicker and make dirtyjokes when the subject of rape is brought up in
the classroom, as long as respected figures like Indiana basketball
coach Bobby Knight joke about relaxing and enjoying rape,99 date
rape will continue to be part of campus culture.100
III
RoPHE ON BAD SEX: WHAT'S SEX FOR THE GANDER
SHOULD BE SEX FOR THE GOOSE
Roiphe does not confine her scorn to women who claim to be
date raped; she is critical of any woman who claims she was verbally
coerced into sex, whether the woman describes her experience as
rape or not.' 0 She writes:
Imagine men sitting around in a circle talking about how she called
him impotent and how she manipulated him into sex, how violated
and dirty he felt afterward, how coercive she was, how she got him
drunk first, how he hated his body and couldn't eat for three weeks
afterward .... There would never be a rule or a law, or even a
pamphlet or peer-counseling group, for men who claimed to have
been emotionally raped or verbally pressured into sex. And for the
same reasons-assumptions of basic competence, free will, and
strength of character-there should be no such rules or groups or
pamphlets for women. 10 2
Roiphe is apparently oblivious to the significant cultural differences in
the way men and women learn to perceive sex and love. Most Ameri-
can women receive a steady diet of romantic messages, which teach
them that marriage is the only way to true happiness.'0 3 This view
99 Tom Shales, Connie Chung Stressing the Obvious, WASH. PosT, Apr. 25, 1988, at B1,
available in 1988 WL 2057146 (discussing Chung's interview with Knight broadcast as a part
of NBC Report on America: Stressed to Kill an NBC television broadcast on April 25, 1998).
100 Lynne Henderson describes the rape culture which permeates our society. "The
hatred of women, the devaluation of women, and the patriarchal structure that has- si-
lenced women and promoted male aggression seem to be preferable places to search for
an explanation." Henderson, supra note 95, at 197.
101 Roiphe's chapter on date rapejumps so often from women who claim to have been
raped to women who describe bad sex that is hard to keep track.
102 ROn'HE, supra note 2, at 68-69.
103 See, e.g., Marcia R. Lieberman, "Someday My Prince Will Come": Female Acculturation
Through the Faiiy Tal COUEGE ENGLISH 383-95 (Dec. 1972), reprinted in S xmsM AND YouTH
228, 228-43 (Diane Gersoni-Stavn ed., 1974). Disney has updated its heroines to some
extent. Belle, the heroine of Beauty and the Beas is a book loving feminist, and the villain
of the movie is a macho man. Nevertheless, Belle's happy ending is exactly the same as
Sleeping Beauty's-she still ends up with the prince.
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inevitably affects their perception of sex. There are numerous studies
that establish that women and men experience sex differently. One
recent survey of teenagers shows that 81% of sexually active boys sur-
veyed referred to their sexual experiences as pleasurable, as compared
to 59% of the girls.' 04 Perhaps even more significantly, a majority of
the boys surveyed said they were not in love with their partner, while
71% of the girls stated that they were in love. 105 The song from Grease
which opened this essay continues to reflect American culture. Wo-
men think of sex in romantic terms ("love at first sight") ;106 men view
it as scoring ("did she put up a fight?").107 Roiphe is right: It is hard
to imagine men discussing exploitive sex; it is equally hard .to imagine
women forming a Spur Posse club and sitting around bragging about
the number of men they have seduced.108
The argument that men and women experience sex differently
finds support in one of the basic themes of cultural feminism: Wo-
men are more relational than men.10 9 It is not surprising that many
men regard sex as an autonomous experience, separated from love
and even from any sense of the identity of one's partner, and that
women experience it as part of a relationship. 110
Because, she lacks empathy, Roiphe also misrepresents the com-
plexity of women's reasons for submitting to unwanted sex. She por-
trays the woman who agrees to sex against her will as passive,
malleable, having "the mind of an eleven-year-old in the body of a
twenty-year-old.""' The reality is far more complicated. Roiphe's
mother told her that she did not have to pretend to be someone other
than herself with a man. 1 2 That was great advice, but Roiphe is amaz-
ingly unaware of the fact that millions of mothers continue to give
their daughters slightly updated versions of the advice Roiphe's grand-
104 Boys Are More Comfortable With Sex Than Girls Are, Survey Finds, N.Y. ThMEs, May 18,
1994, at A16 (quoting a survey done by the Roper Starch and Sexuality Information and
Education Council). Sixty-two percent of the sexually active girls also said they should have
waited until they were older, as compared with 48% of the boys. Id.
105 Id.
106 See supra text accompanying note 1.
107 See supra text accompanying note 1.
108 See Garry Wills, Scoring with the Spur Poss N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 1993, at A22; Garry
Wills, Student Posse Embodies Right-Wing Values, DETRorr FRE PRmSS, Apr. 9, 1993, at 11A.
On the surface, "do-me" feminism, infra notes 119-23 and accompanying text, may resem-
ble male boasting about scoring, but do-me feminists are primarily concerned with sex as a
means for their own pleasure, not as a means to impress others.
109 See, e.g., Gender Differences, supra note 26, at 31-47; West, supra note 26, at 13-42.
110 Of course, my description can be attacked for its own essentialism. There are nu-
merous men who believe in romantic love and numerous women who do not. But the.
statistical evidence still suggests than the differences in the way men and women view sex
are significant and cannot be ignored. See, e.g., ANNF MoIR & DAVIDJESSEL, BRAIN SEX 99-
112 (1991).
111 RoIPHE, supra note 2, at 68.
112 Id. at 4.
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mother gave her mother. "[W]hen you're on a date you should laugh
at a boy's jokes, you should make conversation about the things he is
interested in, and you should pretend everything he says is interesting
even if it's not."113 Even the most superficial analysis of literature di-
rected at teenage girls provides endless variations on this theme-the
woman must do whatever she can to please the man." 4 When a
woman's upbringing teaches her that the presence of men in her life
defines her happiness and even her identity, verbal coercion becomes
significant. The threat of not being loved, of not having a boyfriend,
is much more than the gender-neutral "emotional pressure" Roiphe
dismisses so readily.115
I belong to Roiphe's mother's generation, but unlike Roiphe's
mother, I have not been the model liberal woman. I am glad I have
come a long way from the world of Chi Omega, where the highlight of
one's life was a candlelight ceremony honoring the woman fortunate
enough to be "pinned"116 or better yet, engaged, but I cannot ignore
the continued existence of that world. Feminists should not ignore it
either, because I am confident that there are still more would-be
brides on college campuses than women who even remotely resemble
Roiphe's caricatures of men-hating feminists.117
For many women raised on traditional visions of love, encounter
groups like those Roiphe scorns 18 may be the first step toward escape
from the concept that they must do whatever is necessary to please
men. When Roiphe links her critique of difference and dominance
feminism to her intolerant disapproval of women's honest discussion
of feelings about submitting to unwanted sex, she defeats her own
goal of urging women to take responsibility for their sexuality.
Even if Roiphe would concede the point that women continue to
experience sex differently than men, she would argue that this is not
desirable. One major theme of her book, which is in stark contrast to
its conservative aspects, 119 is an almost wistful vision of the days before
AIDS, when sex was fun and uncomplicated. She complains that peo-
ple today, including herself, think of sex in terms of control, but that
"it hadn't always been like that. In the sixties and seventies, sex was
113 Id. at 4.
114 See, e.g., 50 Things Guys Love, YM, Feb. 1995, at 3, 50 ("What turns him on? The
secrets you need to know.").
115 Id. at 67.
116 Pinning meant accepting a boy's fraternity pin and was an important pre-engage-
ment ritual. In my sorority, it was considered the point at which one could have sex without
losing the boy's respect; as the fraternity boys used to say, "It takes a pin to get in."
117 I don't mean to suggest that wanting to be a bride is incompatible with feminism,
but feminist theory should help women realize that while traditional romantic love may be
a wonderful experience, it is not the only means to happiness.
118 ROIPHE, supra note 2, at 66-69.
119 See supra note 10.
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about expression and orgasm, at least in theory; it was the streamlined
optimism of EricaJong's 'zipless fuck.""120
With her emphasis on the joys of open, uncontrolled sex, Roiphe
implicitly attacks cultural feminism's affirmation of the importance of
relationships and caring behavior. Cultural feminists celebrate the
connectiveness of sex; as Robin West describes it:
Most vital, however, for cultural feminism is the claim that intimacy
is notjust something women do, it is something human beings ought
to do. Intimacy is a source of value, not a private hobby.... Inti-
macy is a value for women because it reflects an existentially con-
nected state of being.' 2 '
In contrast, Roiphe's apparent ideal is that of the liberal male-the
best sex is autonomous, "free," unhampered by any sense of connec-
tion to one's partner. 122 Other young women, whom Esquire featured
as the new "do me" feminists, share Roiphe's view of the empowering
aspects of sexual agency.123 These women, also described as "sexual
agency" or "sexual empowerment" feminists, 124 believe in taking the
initiative in sexual matters and emphasizing the purely pleasurable as-
pects of sexual encounters. Do-me feminist Naomi Wolf says, "I am
perfectly capable of wanting to be surrounded by adoring, nubile sev-
enteen-year-old soccer players who long to do my every bidding." 25
Another do-me feminist laments, "The feminist scholarship of Andrea
Dworkin and Catharine MacKinnon is so dull, so Alan Alda.... A lot
of us just want to go spray-paint and make out with our boyfriends and
not worry about oppression."126
120 ROIPHE, supra note 2, at 168. Along with ERiCAJoNG, FEAR OF FLYING (1973) (the
book which contains the "zipless fuck" concept, id at 11-14), Roiphe canonizes GrmaTaNE
GREER, THE FFmAL EUNci (1972), for its celebration of sexuality and states that Greer's
"comments need to be recycled for present-day feminism." RoiPHE, supra note 2, at 84. If
Greer's comments really were recycled, Roiphe would probably be more dismayed than
pleased. Greer discusses in strong terms the hatred men have for women, an attitude
Roiphe despises in modem feminism.
121 West, supra note 26, at 18.
122 RoIPHE, supra note 2, at 168-72. The central idea of "a Zipless Fuck," described in
the book Roiphe cites with such wistful approval, was that of autonomous unencumbered
sex characterized by "brevity" and "anonymity." JONO, supra note 120, at 11-14.
Along with her celebration of free sex, Roiphe offers a typically liberal defense of
pornography and heaps scorn on the antipornography feminists. For a thorough explana-
tion of the liberal feminist perspective on pornography, see Nadine Strossen, A Feminist
Critique of "The"Feminist Critique of Pornography, 79 VA. L REV. 1099 (1993). The article uses
several of the arguments Roiphe uses and quotes Roiphe's views on date rape with ap-
proval. Id. at 1152 n.208.
123 Tad Friend, Yes, EsQuIRE, Feb. 1994, at 48. The article contained interviews with a
number of women, including Roiphe, who are critical of current dominance feminism.
124 Id. at 50.
125 Id. at 50.
126 Id. at 51.
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Anna Quindlen describes this attitude as "babe feminism-we're
young, we're fun, we do what we want in bed."1 27 While babe feminist
Wolf proclaims, "The male body is home to me,"' 28 Quindlen re-
sponds, "I like guys, but my body is home to me. That is the point of
feminism: I got custody of myself."129
Roiphe views feminists' discussion about the negative aspects of
sex as a return to "the rigidly conformist fifties." 30 She falls to under-
stand that the right to refuse sex without being afraid of violence is
the starting point for true sexual freedom. For many women, defining
sex on their own terms includes a decision to wait for more relational,
meaningful sex. Columnist Ellen Goodman explains: "Sexual libera-
tion is no longer a question of whether and how often a woman does
it with how many men.... It's being redefined by women who need
to feel free from fear, free from pressure, to feel."' 13 When women
reject casual sex as unsatisfying, they should not be told they are re-
pressed Puritans or Clarissas in blue jeans. 32
IV
RoIPHE ON SExuAL HARASSMENT: WHAT'S THE MATTER,
CAN'T You TAKE A DiRmTJoKE?
Roiphe at least acknowledges that rape does occur in violent
"stranger rape" situations1 33
-if a man holds you at knifepoint, she is
willing to admit that this is a crime.' 34 However, in her chapter titled
"Reckless Eyeballing: Sexual Harassment on Campus,"13 5 Roiphe
comes close to denying the very existence of sexual harassment' 36
Women who claim they are sexually harassed are just oversensitive bad
127 Anna Quindlen, And Now, Babe Feminism, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 1994, at A21.
128 Friend, supra note 123, at 49.
129 Quindlen, supra note 127, at A21.
130 ROIPHE, supra note 2, at 83.
131 Ellen Goodman, Frank Talk on Sexual Peasure, TuLsA WoRLD, Friday, Oct. 29, 1993,
at 13.
132 Roiphe describes today's feminists as Clarissas "transported into the twentieth cen-
tury," still concerned with traditional views of chastity and still "attaching the same quasi-
religious value to the physical act." RoiPHE, supra note 2, at 74-75. Much of Roiphe's text
reminds me of the "line" fraternity boys used to use during my college days. Women who
wouldn't "put out" were "frigid" or (gasp-even worse) lesbians.
133 Here, Roiphe is following the line of reasoning described by Susan Estrich: Only
violent, stranger rapes are considered "real" and taken seriously by the police and public.
SusAN ES-aICH, REAL RAPE (1988).
134 In an attempt to contrast "staged" descriptions of rape given by participants in
"Take Back The Night" demonstrations and "real rape," Roiphe describes a friend who was
raped by a man with a knife. This brief narrative is the only place in the book in which she
expresses sympathy for a rape victim. ROIPHE, supra note 2, at 43.
135 d. at 85-112.
136 While Roiphe does give lip service to the idea that there may be some instances in
which sexual harassment can occur, she prefers to broaden these instances into a gender-
neutral concept of abuses of power. Id. at 104.
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sports, "hothouse flowers"' 37 who will wilt in the real world. Her vi-
sion of what women should do if they are harassed is uncompromising
and macho: "If someone bothers us, we should be able to put him in
his place without crying into our pillow or screaming for help or
counseling."13
This statement both understates the nature of sexual harass-
ment-it is far more than being "bothered"-and mischaracterizes
the strength of women's responses. It is not a sign of weakness or
crying into one's pillow to file complaints and to sue one's harasser.
The woman who chooses to follow this route can count on peer disap-
proval and possible loss of employment opportunities. The vilification
of Anita Hill, hardly a frail "hothouse flower," is an example of what a
woman describing her experience can expect.' 3 9
Roiphe's analysis of sexual harassment is entirely gender-neutral
and oblivious to the unequal power relationships between men and
women. She does acknowledge that a professor should not offer to
trade sex for a grade, 140 but she attempts to turn this clear example of
quid pro quo sexual harassment' 4 ' into a mere abuse of power, com-
paring the situation to a professor trading grades for a thousand dol-
lars. 142 This approach fails to understand that sexual harassment is a
form of sex discrimination, not just an abuse of power. The underly-
ing idea is simple and straightforward-people should not be sub-
jected to offensively different treatment because of their sex.' 43 In
contrast, Roiphe asserts that women should heed the childhood ad-
age: "Sticks and stones may break my bones, but names will never
hurt me."' 44 This advice attempts to turn women into docile victims
137 Id. at 109.
138 Id. at 101.
139 See Emma C. Jordan, Race, Gender, and Social Class in the Thomas Sexual Harassment
Hearings: The Hidden Fault Lines in Political Discourse, 15 HARv. WOMEN'S LJ. 1 (1993).
140 RoipHE, supra note 2, at 104.
141 See Equal Employment Opportunity Commissions's Guidelines on Discrimination
Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)-(g) (1993). The guidelines state:
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or
physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment when (1)
submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or
condition of an individual's employment, (2) submission to or rejection of
such conduct by an individual is used as the basis for employment decisions
affecting such individual, or (3) such conduct has the purpose or effect of
unreasonably interfering with an individuals's work performance or creat-
ing an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.
Id. § 1604.11(a). The first two sections of the definition of sexual harassment constitute
quid pro quo harassment. The third section constitutes hostile environment harassment.
142 ROIPHE, supra note 2, at 104.
143 See, e.g., CATHARiNE MACINN N, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORMNG WomsEN: A CASE
oF SEx DISCUMIN~ArON (1979).
144 ROIPHE, supra note 2, at 101. Roiphe offers her mother, who was flattered by com-
ments of construction workers, as a desirable model. Id. at 102.
[Vol. 80:612
BOOK REVIEW- GENDER STEREOTYPES
of behavior they should not have to tolerate, an ironic position from
an author who accuses feminists of turning women into weaklings.
Roiphe also attacks sexual harassment on another ground. In
typical liberal language she complains that " [t]he boundaries are sub-
jective, the maps subject to mood.... The hostility or offensiveness of
a working environment is naturally hard to measure by objective stan-
dards. Such vague categorization opens the issue up to the individual
psyche."145 Roiphe's implication that courts do not attempt to use
objective standards in analyzing sexual harassment cases is incorrect.
The Supreme Court has held that sexual harassment is conduct which
creates an "objectively hostile or abusive work environment-an envi-
ronment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive."' 46
The majority of lower federal courts use the objective reasonable per-
son standard in sexual harassment cases, 147 although the Ninth Cir-
cuit has turned to the reasonable woman standard,148 a concept
Roiphe would undoubtedly abhor.'
With her ciiticism of subjective, contextual decisionmaking in
sexual harassment cases, Roiphe rejects the cultural feminist insight
that "objectivity" and "neutrality" are just masks for the perspective of
the middle class white man. As Leslie Bender explains: "Limited
male perspectives are masked, erased, or universalized through tech-
niques of objective, third-person language and author invisibility, but
those techniques do not make them less limited in fact."' 49 The
phrase "reasonable person" appears objective on the surface, but de-
ciding exactly what type of behavior typifies the reasonable person is
inevitably a subjective inquiry, subject to individual biases.
False objectivity may be particularly dangerous in sexual harass-
ment cases because, as cultural feminists understand, men and woman
may view workplace behavior differently. For example, a woman who
lives with the constant fear of rape may feel threatened by a man who
sends her strange notes about his attraction to her, while a man in the
same situation might not be afraid. 150 As one court has observed,
145 Id. at 90.
146 Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 867, 370 (1993).
147 See, e.g., Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
481 U.S. 1041 (1987); Kirkland v. Brinias, 741 F. Supp. 692 (E.D. Tenn. 1989), aff'd, 944
F.2d 905 (6th Cir. 1991).
148 Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991). For discussion of the merits of
the reasonable woman standard, see, e.g., Naomi R. Cahn, The Looseness of Legal Language:
The Reasonable Woman Standard in Theory and Practice, 77 CORNELL L REv. 1398 (1992);
Nancy S. Ehrenreich, Pluralist Myth and Pouwrless Men. The Ideology of Reasonableness in Sexual
Harassment Law, 99 YALE LJ. 1177 (1990); Lucinda M. Finley, A Break in the Silence: Including
Women's Issues in a Tort Course, 1 YALEJ.L. & FEnISM 41 (1989).
149 Gender Difference, supra note 26, at 19.
150 This example is a brief summary of the facts in Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872 (9th
Cir. 1991). One of the notes said: "I have enjoyed you so much over these past few
months. Watching you. Experiencing you from O so far away... Don't you think it odd
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"[M] en and women are vulnerable in different ways and offended by
different behavior."' 51 Gender differences may also influence the of-
fender's understanding of sexual harassment Nancy Ehrenreich ar-
gues, "[S]ome men who engage in (what I would call) harassing
behavior do so with neither conscious hostility towards women nor an
awareness of the effect of their conduct...."15 2 Any meaningful anal-
ysis of sexual harassment must take these differences into account;
Roiphe's failure to do so limits the usefulness of her discussion.
Because she relies on her own experience so heavily, Roiphe's
description of sexual harassment centers primarily on academia. She
characterizes it as a world in which overemphasis on sexual harass-
ment creates an "atmosphere of suspicion and distrust"153 that ruins
the normal teacher-student relationship. The area of academic rela-
tionships is one which raises a number of difficult questions, such as
whether apparently voluntary student-teacher dating constitutes har-
assment. 54 Unfortunately, Roiphe's bulldozer analysis is so deter-
mined to reject the idea that sexual harassment is ever a real problem
that it destroys her credibility 55 and therefore does not succeed in
generating the thoughtful discussion that the issues deserve.
Roiphe is especially outraged at the idea that women in power
can claim to be sexually harassed. After a dubious example of a
"teacher's" (really a teaching assistant's) ' 56 claim that she was sexually
harassed by a student, Roiphe proclaims:
Our female professors and high-ranking executives, our congress-
women and editors, are every bit as strong as their male counter-
parts.... To declare that their authority is vulnerable to a dirtyjoke
that two people who have never even talked together, alone, are striking off such intense
sparks.... " Id. at 874 (ellipses in original). When one of my classes discussed this case,
the overwhelming majority of men felt that the note was odd, but not threatening. Most of
the women felt that if they had received the note they would have been afraid that the
writer would stalk and rape them.
151 Yates v. AVCO Corp., 819 F.2d 630, 637 n.2 (6th Cir. 1987).
152 Ehrenreich, supra note 148, at 1194.
153 ROIPHE, supra note 2, at 92. Again, Roiphe draws a highly universalist conclusion
from her limited perspective. It may or may not be true that this atmosphere exists at
Harvard and Princeton. It certainly does not exist at the University of Tulsa, a college
which has never had a sexual harassment complaint brought against a professor.
154 Some feminists argue that even consensual dating perpetuates gender inequality.
See, e.g., West, supra note 86, at 109-11.
155 It does so at least among the audience she claims to want to reach-women stu-
dents and professors. She has a great deal of credibility among hard-core conservatives,
who never liked the idea of sexual harassment in the first place.
156 ROIPHE, supra note 2, at 88-89. Roiphe first describes the woman claiming to be
harassed as a teaching assistant. Then, in the same paragraph, Roiphe refers to her as a
"teacher." Teaching assistants have different positions at different schools, but are often
graduate students who do not have any real power over the students with whom they inter-
act. Roiphe is being intellectually dishonest when she compares a student-teaching assis-
tant power relationship to a professor-student relationship.
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from someone of inferior status just because that person happens to
be a man is to undermine their position.' 5 7
This approach is a nice example of wishful thinking, but unfortu-
nately it does not reflect reality for women in power. Studies of wo-
men professors have established that they are vulnerable to the
behavior of male students.158 Male students can use teaching evalua-
tions to critically undermine a professor's authority in the early stages
of her career. Harassment may subtly affect a teacher's confidence
and concentration and ultimately affect her performance in the class-
room. Even tenured professors are not immune to feelings of insecu-
rity when their students and colleagues make them feel objectified
because of their sex.
One of the legal fraternities in my school recently held a fun-
draiser in which faculty members would sit in a chair above a bucket
and be "dunked" by students throwing a ball. To publicize this event,
students placed large T-shirts bearing the words "Wet T-shirt contest"
behind the podiums in our major classrooms. When I imagined
teaching in this setting, I pictured the inevitable giggles and snickers
that would occur as students whispered about how I would look in a
wet T-shirt. The other women teachers on my faculty had the same
reaction and the shirts were eventually removed. 15 9
Of course, Katie Roiphe would characterize our reactions as signs
of weakness, but the real sign of weakness would have been accepting
the situation without protest. The woman professor who initially com-
plained about the T-shirts was untenured. I was impressed by the
courage she showed in raising a controversial and unpopular issue,
even in light of the assistant dean's refusal to admit that the T-shirts
might have sexual connotations. Ultimately, I found the T-shirt inci-
dent to be an empowering occasion for myself and the other faculty
women.' 6 0 The creation of the tort of sexual harassment' 6' has told
women that we do not have to accept insulting, demeaning behavior
157 Id. at 90.
158 See, e.g., Marina Angel, Women in Legal Education: Wat It's Like to Be Part of a Perpet-
ual First Wave or the Case of the Disappearing Women, 61 TmPeLE L. REv. 799, 832-33 (1988)
(documenting male students' negative reactions to female teachers);Joan M. Krauskopf,
Touching the Elephant: Perceptions of Gender Issues in Nine Law Schools, 44J. LEGAL EDUC. 311,
330-31 (1994); Elyce H. Zenoff& Kathryn V. Lorio, Wat WeKnow, Wat We Think WeKnow,
and What We Don't Know about Women Law Professors, 25 ARuz. L REv. 869, 879 (1983).
159 The administration offered a gender-neutral reason for the removal of the shirts:
Any extremely large "sign" would be disruptive to classes and henceforth the law school
would limit the size of any classroom posters.
160 The incident was also positive because it gave the faculty women a chance to work
together. Our victory provides another example of the effectiveness of the group activity
that Roiphe so emphatically rejects. See infra part V.A.
161 I am not necessarily claiming that placement of the T-shirts constituted hostile en-
vironment sexual harassment, although I think a good case could be made to that effect.
My point is that the existence of case law on the subject provided support for our conten-
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as a "fact of life" as Roiphe would have it. Contrary to Roiphe's asser-
tions, this message is a positive one for women-when we stand up for
ourselves against sexist behavior we feel stronger, not weaker.
V
WOMEN AS VICrIMS AND STEREOTPES
A. The Victimization Theme
Roiphe condemns the "Take Back the Night" demonstration in
which women discuss their experiences as rape victims. She writes:
Although the march is intended to celebrate and bolster women's
strength, it seems instead to celebrate their vulnerability. The
marchers seem to accept, even embrace, the mantle of victim status.
As the speakers describe every fear, every possible horror suffered at
the hands of men, the image they project is one of helplessness and
passivity.162
Roiphe's criticism is part of the "I am woman, hear me roar"' 63 rheto-
ric that is increasingly common among feminists who believe that
when women talk about their problems, they portray themselves as
weak, powerless victims.' 6 4
This popular proposition denies the reality of the number of inci-
dents of violence against women. As columnist Ellen Goodman points
out, one reason women portray themselves as victims is that they so
often are. Over four million women are the victims of domestic vio-
lence every year, and three quarters of all women will be the victim of
some form of violence in their lifetime.' 65 At least 13% of women are
rape victims,' 66 and marital rape remains legal in some form in many
states.' 67 Calling attention to the staggering number of women who
are the subject of violent attacks is an important step toward decreas-
ing the frequency of these attacks. Women's reluctance to seek legal
tions about why we felt uncomfortable teaching in that setting-it also helped keep us
from feeling like isolated cranks.
162 RoIPHE, supra note 2, at 43-44.
163 The reference is to a song by Helen Reddy. HELEN REDDY, I Am Woman, on HELEN
REDDY'S GRKATEsT Hrrs (Capitol Records 1987).
164 See, e.g., Paglia, supra note 6; Wolf, supra note 6. Ironically, a'though Roiphe de-
cries victimization, her book at times reads like a version of "Take Back the Academy" in
which she portrays herself as the victim of authoritative feminists who call her names and
reject her unorthodox views. ROIPHE, supra note 2, at 6-7.
165 Deborah L. Rhode, Feminism and the State, 107 HARv. L. REv. 1181, 1193 (1994)
(citing STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON THEJUDICIARY, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., VxOLENCE AGAiNST
WOMEN: A WEEK IN THE LIFE OF AMERICA, 11 (Comm. Print 1992)).
166 Crichton, supra note 7. As previously discussed, rape statistics are controversial. See
supra notes 69-76 and accompanying text.
167 KATHERINE BARTLETr, GENDER & LAw 521-22 (1993); see also Robin West, Equality
Theory, Marital Rape, and the Promise of the Fourteenth Amendment, 42 FLA. L. REV. 45, 47 n.9
(1990).
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recourse for crimes against them has made rape one of the country's
most underreported crimes,168 and for years kept police from taking
domestic violence seriously.169
Women must talk about being victims as long as our culture de-
nies or trivializes their victimization. Despite the severity of their of-
fenses, only 2-5% of accused rapists are actually convicted, 170 and few
domestic violence cases result in serious punishment.' 71 A classic ex-
ample of society's failure to accept the seriousness of violence against
women occurred in the highly publicized murder case of Nicole Simp-
son, ex-wife of the famous football star O.J. Simpson.' 72 Despite un-
disputed reports of the athlete's history of battering his wife, many
Americans persisted in referring to Simpson as a "hero" and cheered
"Go, O.J., Go" while he was attempting to evade the police. 173
Although many people had known about Simpson's history of wife
abuse, he never lost his lucrative commercial endorsements or his job
as a television sports commentator. 174 The clear message was that the
injuries Simpson's wife sustained were not really important, certainly
not as serious as if the football star had been caught gambling or tak-
ing drugs.175
Women must also claim victim status to make clear that the
crimes committed against them are not their fault. Despite numerous
changes in rape laws, the victim is often implicitly asked what she did
168 RHODE, supra note 30, at 246.
169 DEL MARTrN, BATTERED WIVES 93-100 (1977).
170 RHODE, supra note 30, at 246. Conviction rates are much lower for rapes than for
other serious felonies. Henderson, supra note 72, at 128.
171 Id. at 1194.
172 Michael Fleeman, Not Guilty' Says 0.J. Prosecution: Simpson Planned Dual Slaying,
DAYrON DAILY Nws, June 21, 1994, at 1A, available in 1994 WL 3876404.
173 See, e.g., Ellen Goodman, Who Tried to Stop Him? Fans and Friends LongAgo Lost Sight
of the True Victims in 0.1 Simpson's Tragedy, BostoN GLOBE, June 22, 1994, atA9; Paul Green-
berg, Yesterday's Hero, 0.j.: An Othello For Our Times, TuLsA WoRn, June 23, 1994, at A14;
Bob Herbert, Juice and Reality, N.Y. TimEs, June 22, 1994, at Al1; Anna Quindlen, Remember
Nicole Simpson, N.Y. TiMs, June 22, 1994, at All.
174 Mariah B. Nelson, Bad Sports, N.Y. TiMEs, June 22, 1994, at A21. Another example
of society's willingness to forgive male sports heroes for behavior that it would not sanction
in women was the praise heaped upon basketball superstar Magic Johnson, when he an-
nounced that he was HIV positive. The public accepted Johnson's revelation that he had
slept with hundreds of women without a blink. Alison Muscatine, Johnson Reveals He Knew
Test Results Earlier, WASH. Posr, Nov. 13, 1991, at Al, available in 1991 WL 2108150. While
Johnson, unlike Simpson, is a genuinely sympathetic character, tennis star Martina Navra-
tilova nevertheless had a valid point when she stated that if a woman hadJohnson's record,
she would be condemned immediately as a promiscuous slut. Navratilova Knocks Magic's
Afessage, WASH. Posr, Nov. 21, 1991, at B2, available in 1991 WL 2106532.
175 In contrast, tennis star Jennifer Capriati lost millions of dollars in endorsements
when she was arrested for a minor marijuana offense. See Tennis Star's Layer Denies Drug
Abuse DAYTON DAILY NEWs, May 20, 1994, at A4, available in 1994 WL 4305757. Pete Rose
found himself ostracized for his gambling. Shirley Povich, Say Goodbye to Charlie Hustler,
WASH. PosT, July 21, 1990, at D7, available in 1990 WL 2119466.
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to "ask for it."176 If she wore provocative clothing, had been drinking,
or had a sexual history, juries have often considered her to be the real
cause of the crime and acquitted her rapist.177 Similarly, the victim's
provocative conduct is considered a relevant factor in sexual harass-
ment cases. 178 Women who have been battered ask themselves what
they did to provoke the behavior and are blamed for staying in the
abusive situation.179
Along with her refusal to acknowledge the compelling reasons for
discussing crimes against women, Roiphe also fails to appreciate the
strength of the movement against sexual oppression of women.
Roiphe is contemptuous of group action and public experiences; she
claims that "the individual power of each story is sapped by the collec-
tive mode of expression."' 8 0
Roiphe's rejection of group political activity is amazingly ahistori-
cal; it ignores most of the significant gains underrepresented groups
have made through collective action. Women working together
against date rape have made tremendous strides toward increasing
public awareness of the crime.' 81 If demonstrations about date rape
are really just ineffective whimpers of frail women, as Roiphe con-
tends,182 then it is hard to explain the anger and attention that the
issue has generated. The eagerness of the media to highlight com-
ments like "someone's rape may be another person's bad night' 83
and the hostility directed at Catharine MacKinnon 8 4 are reactions of
a patriarchal culture on the defensive.
Another flaw of the "antivictim" rhetoric is that it reverts to the
patriarchal emphasis on keeping a stiff upper lip. This attitude fails to
understand the courage that it takes to discuss your feelings in public.
It is far easier not to talk about being raped than to expose yourself to
people who will not believe you or who will blame you for the rape.
Lynne Henderson describes her own experience:
176 Henderson, supra note 72, at 160.
177 Id. at 160.
178 See Ann C. Juliano, Note, Did She Ask For It? The "Unwelcome" Requirement in Second
Harassment Cases, 77 CoRNELL L. REV. 1558, 1582-87 (1992).
179 Marta R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation,
90 MicH. L. REV. 1, 61-63 (1991).
180 ROIPHE, supra note 2, at 36.
181 See, e.g., Susan Estrich, Palm Beach Stories, 11 LAw & PmL. 5 (1992) in which the
author states with regard to date rape, "[O]nly a few years ago, itwas hard to get anyone to
take the topic seriously. Lately, there have been days when it seems as if no one in America
was talking about anything else." Id. at 5.
182 ROIPHE, supra note 2, at 42-44.
183 Id. at 54.
184 A book review of MacKinnon's latest book began, "Suppose I decide to rape Catha-
rine MacKinnon before reviewing her book." Carlin Romano, Between The Motion and the
Act; NATION, Nov. 15, 1993, at 563.
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I do not think I can ever overcome the nasty rumors about me that
were spread because I was open about the assault. That may be the
price you pay for speaking out, and I understand why other rape
survivors find that price too high to pay.... But we are doomed to
stay in the traps of rape mythology unless we look at what rape really
is. Women and men must confront the horror, not deny it, and do
everything in their power to end it.1 8 5
It may seem contradictory to state that women must proclaim their
victimization to stop being victims, but Henderson is right-the only
way to end rape is to talk about its impact on its victims.
Roiphe belittles the impact that rape has on women; she
proclaims:
The idea that date rape remains with the victim, that it necessarily
cripples her, that she can never trust men again, that she must be
counseled.., are part and parcel of the same old ethos of female
victimhood. In institutionalizing the assumption that rape is univer-
sally life-threatening, feminists are institutionalizing female
weakness. 186
Roiphe fails to hear voices like Lynne Henderson's, which summarize
the complex emotions women feel after rape:
I was scared-at the least little noise I would jump and sometimes
scream; I was in pain; I was furious with men and my vulnerability; I
was in mourning.... I had never confronted the utter helplessness
of rape, of knowing that it just did not matter that I existed; that I did
not want this; that I was a human being; not a thing to be invaded,
punched, or possibly killed.1
87
This is not the voice of a whimpering crybaby, but the voice of a
strong survivor who has had the inner strength and courage to con-
front her feelings after rape and deal with them with painful honesty.
Roiphe's failure to understand this shows her own weakness, not
Henderson's.
Throughout her book, with her disdain for women who seek
counseling for emotional problems, Roiphe appears to be asking "why
can't a woman be more like a man?" 188 Cultural feminists recognize
that men are more likely to deny the existence of emotional injuries
and less likely to turn to professionals for help with their problems. 8 9
But to say this behavior is desirable betrays a lack of understanding of
185 Henderson, supra note 95, at 224.
186 RoIPHE, supra note 2, at 74.
187 Henderson, supra note 95, at 223.
188 This quotation is from the popular musical, Ai. J. LEram & FaroEmcK LOEwE,
My FAR LADY (1956) (lyrics to the song Why Can't a Woman Be More Like a Man heard in Act
II, Scene IV).
189 See Women in Cisis More Likely To Seek Profeional Help, TuLsA WoRLD,June 12, 1994,
at L.
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the consequences of repressing emotional problems. Who is really
stronger, for example, the alcoholic who admits he has a problem and
seeks professional help, or the one who continues in a state of denial
until his illness has destroyed his life and that of his family?
Although Roiphe claims to hate the supposed uniformity in con-
temporary feminism, her own version of the desirable new feminist
rigidly portrays emotions just like her own. As one commentator
notes:
Roiphe and Paglia are not exactly invoking rules, but their com-
ments seem to derive from a belief that everyone except idiots inter-
prets information and experience in the same way. In that sense,
they are not so different... from those ladies dedicated to establish-
ing feminist-based rules and regulations for sex. Such rules, just'
like the old rules, assume a certain psychological uniformity of ex-
perience, a right way.19 0
B. The Stereotyping Theme
Roiphe complains that modem feminism reinforces Victorian ste-
reotypes of women as passive and sweet, as "the naive girl child who
trusts the rakish man."19' Roiphe compares date rape pamphlets to
"Victorian guides to conduct"192 and invokes images of Shakespeare's
Lucrece 193 and Samuel Richardson's Clarissa 94 to prove this point.
Similarly, Joan Williams claims "'relational feminists' reclaim the
compliments of Victorian gender ideology while rejecting its in-
sults." 19 5 This fear of a return to Victorian stereotypes of females may
be a straw woman (perhaps actually made out of gossamer), but it is a
common critique of cultural feminism, 96 and, as Roiphe's book illus-
trates, it is one that can be manipulated in dangerous ways. The con-
sequences of a retreat from the important work feminists have done to
increase awareness of date rape and sexual harassment are worse than
190 Gaitskill, supra note 2, at 38.
191 ROIPHE, supra note 2, at 71.
192 Id. at 66.
193 Id. at 70 (referring to Wi-LuiAm SHAKsPEARE, THE RAPE OF LUCRECE (Penguin Books
1971) (1594)).
194 Id. at 71-72 (referring to SAMUEL RICHARDSON, CiAwxsSA, OR, THE HISTORY OF A
YoUNG LADY- COMPREHENDING THE MOST IMPORTANT CONCERNS OF PRIVATE LIFE (AMS
Press 1990)).
195 Williams, supra note 38, at 807.
196 See, e.g., id.; Feminism Historided, supra note 89, at 1187-1213. Author Rene
Denfield is writing a book called The New Viwtorians: Why Young Women Are Abandoning the
Women's Movement. Friend, supra note 123, at 52. The charge of Victorianism has been
leveled at dominance feminists as well as cultural feminists. Author Nadine Strossen de-
scribes the antipornography movement as "perpetuat[ing] demeaning stereotypes about
women." Strossen, supra note 122, at 1147. Author Pete Hamill calls dominance feminists
the "New Victorians." Id. at 1150 n.198 (quoting Pete Hamill, Women on the Verge of A Legal
Breakdown, PLAYBOY, Jan. 1993, at 186).
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the partial reality that these movements may reinforce some stereo-
types about women.
The issue of stereotyping of women is far more complex than
Roiphe and other critics of cultural feminism acknowledge. As
Kimberle Crenshaw and other critical race theorists have demon-
strated, the Victorian virgin image was never applied to women of
color.197 There is no single coherent stereotype of women that can be
identified and combatted. Further,' stereotypes about women often
contradict each other. Women are both too passive and castrating
bitches, frivolous and lacking a sense of humor. Because stereotypes
include joined opposites, when we attack one side of a linked pair, we
strengthen its opposite counterpart. The feminist analysis of date
rape confronts the stereotypes about women that lead to date rape-
women are either angelic virgins or whores,198 who deserve to be
raped' 99-and attacks the myth that when a woman says no, she really
means yes.2 00 Feminists' insistence that "no means no" may create
images of female purity, but the danger of "no means yes" and other
myths about rape 201 exceed any damage done by outmoded stereo-
types. Any abstract threat stereotypes pose to women fades in compar-
ison to the personal injuries sustained by sexual oppression. If
Vivienne Rabidue, the plaintiff in Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co.,2 0 2
had been given a choice of submitting to her co-worker's epithets of
197 Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist
Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 139, 157 ("Historically, there has been absolutely no institutional effort to regu-
late Black female chastity."). Similarly, Angela Harris argues that "as a legal matter, the
experience of rape did not even exist for black women." Angela Harris, Race and Essential-
ism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REv. 581, 599 (1990).
198 As Lynne Henderson puts it:
[T]he proud female fighting to the utmost is not a 'real man'; she is a
particular vision of female 'virtue'-as opposed to the 'fallen' whore. If the
victim does not fight, then she must be a fallen whore who consented. Be-
cause we expect men to persist in this culture unless the woman does some-
thing drastic, it must be a 'seduction' rather than a rape.
Henderson, supra note 95, at 204.
199 Traditionally, criminal law treatises stated that it was a "mockery" to speak of raping
a prostitute. RoLLIN PEmutNs & RONALD N. BoYCE, CPiMn'AL LAW 205 (1982). Feminist
efforts have generally eliminated these antiquated notions. See Mary I. Coombs, Crime in the
Stacks or a Tale of a Text: A Feminist Response to a Criminal Law Textbook, 38J. LEGAL EDUC.
117 (1988).
200 See generally Lois Pineau, Date Rape: A Feminist Analysis, 8 LAw & PHIL 217 (1989).
201 These include the myth that all women have rape fantasies (a classic example is
Rhett Butler carrying Scarlett O'Hara up the stairs in the movie Gone With The Wind), that
women cannot be raped if they do not want to be, and that rape victims "ask for it." Hen-
derson, supra note 95, at 224. See also Morrison Torrey, When Will We Be Believed? Rape Myths
and the Idea of a Fair Trial in Rape Prosecutions, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1013 (1991).
202 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denie, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987).
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her as "cunt," "pussy," and "fat ass"'20 or being called a "Victorian
woman," I have no doubt which harm she would choose.
The critics' concern about the passive Victorian stereotype seems
especially misplaced in light of current perceptions of women and sex
crimes. As Lynne Henderson points out, the prevalent "story" of rape
is one of male innocence and female guilt.2 0 4 The most pervasive ster-
eotype of women today is not the cowering Clarissa, as Roiphe claims,
but the "man-hating" humorless "feminazi."205 This stereotype may
eventually change, but its contrast to older stereotypes shows us that
we cannot shape our debates about feminist strategy and issues
around an exaggerated fear of stereotypes. Leslie Bender provides a
powerful answer to the concerns of critics like Roiphe and Williams:
If stereotypes are going to be used against us, as they have been in
the past, they will be so used regardless of what we say or do. Those
who want to exercise their power by disadvantaging women based
on stereotypes did so long before we celebrated women's cultures
and will do so long after, no matter which strategy we select in our
struggle for justice for women. 206
VI
RoIPHE'S VERSION OF LIBERAL FEMINISM
As I have discussed, Roiphe's book echoes many of the current
feminist critiques of both dominance and cultural feminism, critiques
that have resulted in postmodernism 20 7 becoming the dominant
"voice" in current feminist thought20 8 Additionally, Roiphe's work ex-
emplifies a strand of feminist theory that is sometimes combined with
postmodernism-a call for a return to a reformulated version of liber-
alism. This is an idea that Anne Dailey applauds in Feminism's Return to
203 Id. at 624 (Keith,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The co-worker also
said, "All that bitch needs is a good lay." Id.
204 Henderson, supra note 72, at 130.
205 See Diane Rehm, We Need A Truth Detector, WASH. PosT, June 30, 1994, at A31
(describing television and radio commentator Rush Limbaugh's characterization of femi-
nists as "feminazis"); see also Ellen Goodman, Wat Out-The Straw Feminist Is Back and They
Say She Mad, BosTON GLOBE, Jan. 27, 1994, at All (discussing attempts to characterize
Lorena Bobbit, who cut off her husband's penis, as the ultimate role model for feminists).
206 Gender Differences, supra note 26, at 44.
207 Definitions of postmodernism vary, but there is general agreement that "the
postmodern view of the individual or the legal subject opposes the Enlightenment view of
the stable coherent self." BARTI=TT, supra note 167, at 671. Patricia Smith describes
postmodern feminists as "[denying] that categorical, abstract theories derived through rea-
son and assumptions about the essence of human nature can serve as the foundation of
knowledge." PATciA SMrrH, FEMINsTJuRSPRuDENcE 6 (1993).
208 See, e.g., MARYJOE FRUG, POSTMODRN LEGAL FEaSIMos (1992); Cain, supra note 35;
Jane Flax, Postmodernism and Gender Relations in Feminist Theoy, 12 SIGNS 624 (1987); Dissolv-
ing the Sameness/Difference Debate, supra note 39.
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Liberalism,209 her book review of Katherine Bartlett's collection of fem-
inist jurisprudence essays.210 Dailey surveys the decline of cultural
and dominance feminism and concludes that
to the extent that any one political theme may be said to emerge
from the most recent essays in this book, it is a theme closely resem-
bling the liberal principles of diversity. The difference debate has
led feminism toward the articulation of a renewed liberalism, a re-
deemed liberalism in which the philosophy of possessive individual-
ism characteristic of classic liberalism has been tempered by a
principle of empathy.21'
Similarly, at the end of one of her articles, Joan Williams speaks with
approval of the radical future of liberal feminism. 21 2 This approach is
consistent with the "new" liberal feminists, who emphasize that their
version of feminism is an attempt to "realize liberalism's full poten-
tial,"2 1 3 and very different from traditional, patriarchal liberalism.
One major problem with this theory is that once a dominant
school of thought has acquired well recognized characteristics, it is
difficult to remove these characteristics from the minds of others.
Feminists who believe they can transform a thought system based on
the concept of individual autonomy into a system that offers "the pos-
sibility of political union built upon bonds deeper than self inter-
est"2 1 4 underestimate the difficulties of such a transformation.
Roiphe's book, which consistently advocates individualized solutions
to sexual oppression215 and rejects group activity such as "Take Back
the Night" demonstrations,2 16 is a more realistic example of what hap-
pens when one combines feminism with liberalism.
Dailey advocates use of narratives21 7 as a means to "reconstruct
the liberal ideal we already have in an attempt to realize its full
emancipatory potential."218 But the liberal emphasis on abstract "ob-
209 Anne Dailey, Feminism's Return To Liberalism, 102 YALE LJ. 1266 (1993).
210 FEMINisT LEGAL THEORY. READINGS IN LAW AND GENDER (Katharine T. Bartlett &
Rosanne Kennedy eds., 1991).
211 Dailey, supra note 209, at 1266-67. For another thought-provoking defense of lib-
eral thought, see Linda C. McClain, "Atomistic Man" Pvisited: Liberalism, Connection, and
FeministJurisprudence 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 1171 (1992).
212 Gender Wars, supra note 39, at 1663.
213 Deborah L. Rhode, Feminist Critical Theories, 42 STAN. L. Rzv. 617 (1990), reprinted in
FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY. READINGS IN LAw AND GENDER, supra note 209, at 333, 337.
214 Dailey, supra note 208, at 1283.
215 RoIPHE, supra note 2, at 101.
216 Id. at 29-50. Roiphe writes: "But an individual conversation is worlds away from the
spectacle of mass confession. I find the public demand-and it is a demand-for intimacy
strange and unconvincing." k at 43.
217 Narratives have become a central part of feministiurisprudence. See, e.g., Abrams,
supra note 49; Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills and Sunday Shoes: Notes
on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 BuFF. L. REV. 1 (1990); Patricia Williams, On Being The Object of
Property, 14 SIGNS 5 (1988).
218 Dailey, supra note 208, at 1285.
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jective" truths219 is not compatible with the use of narratives. Liberal
critics of storytelling are already demanding that storytelling must
contain "[r]eason and analysis," 220 two terms closely associated with
traditional liberalism.22' When two fundamentally incompatible ap-
proaches to scholarship are blended, the result will probably be more
like The Morning After than Dailey's emancipatory ideal.222 Roiphe's
book uses narratives to express liberal ideas and although her narra-
tives are not particularly believable, 223 the liberal press has picked up
her themes and restated them in authoritative, abstract terms to repre-
sent universal truths.224
Roiphe's book is not limited to narratives. In many places, she
reverts to universal, abstract statements to make her point. Her use of
overly broad arguments suffers from the common failure of liberals to
consider situations in context. For example, Roiphe argues, "To find
wanted sexual attention, you have to give and receive a certain
amount of unwanted sexual attention."22 5 This statement is hard to
refute on its face, but it masks the significant range of unwanted sex-
ual attentions. A man asking a woman "Would you like to go to a
movie Friday night?" is a far cry from a man grabbing a woman by her
ponytail, forcing her head back and sticking his tongue in her
mouth.2 26 Both behaviors can accurately be characterized as "un-
wanted sexual attention" if the woman is not attracted to the man, but
219 For liberal defenses of objectivity, see Heidi Li Feldman, Objectivity in LegalJudg-
ment4 92 MiciH. L. Rrv. 1187 (1994);Jules L. Coleman & Brian Leiter, Determinacy, Objectiv-
ity, and Authority, 142 U. PA. L. REv. 549 (1993). Those authors explicitly note the feminist
challenge to objectivity and reject it. Feldman, supra at 1187; Coleman & Leiter, supra at
551 nn.7-8.
220 Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories Out of SchoL An Essay on Legal
Narratives, 45 STAN. L. REv. 807, 845 (1993).
221 As one critic of the approach of Farber & Sherry, id., argues: "This premise as-
sumes precisely what many storytellers dispute, namely, that mainstream, ordinary, and
conventional standards are just 'there' and themselves are already justified." Jane B.
Baron, Resistance To Stories, 67 S. CAL. L. Rrv. 255, 256 (1994). Baron additionally argues
that one of the major goals of storytelling is to question standards like "reason" and "analy-
sis." Id. at 259. I agree with this argument and believe it proves the futility of Dailey's
attempt to use storytelling to transform liberalism.
222 I do agree with Dailey that narratives are important to feminist theory. I also agree
that they help resolve the conflict between essentialist views of women and the postmodern
dissolution of the very category of woman. However, I do not accept the contention that
they can accomplish the transformation of traditional liberalism.
223 As Kathryn Abrams has noted, Roiphe's narratives suffer from her failure to in-
clude herself as a protagonist in her stories. Abrams, supra note 19, at 1542-43. They are
also simply not as well written or compelling as narratives of feminist authors such as Patri-
cia Williams, supra note 217, or Lucie White, supra note 217.
224 See Crichton, supra note 7.
225 RoIPHE, supra note 2, at 87.
226 Senator Robert Packwood has been accused of this type of behavior. See PeterJ.
Boyer, The Ogre's Tale, NEw YORKER, Apr. 4, 1994, at 36, 41. Ironically, Packwood, like
Roiphe, continues to characterize sexual harassment as unwanted sexual advances.
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no woman should be expected to submit to the second type of unwel-
come advance.227
The only way to counter the seemingly irrefutable logic of
Roiphe's type of liberal analysis is with the contextual approach of
cultural feminism.228 Dailey, in her advocacy of a return to liberalism
through the use of narratives, recognizes the importance of "a call to
context"229 but fails to recognize that liberalism's commitment to "the
rule of law" is, by its very nature, anticontextual. 230
Beyond the use of narratives, Dailey advocates an emphasis on
empathy as a guiding force of liberalism and contends that "[f] eminist
theory can help us to recognize that we are not alienated souls coming
together in a spirit of empty pluralism, but individuals profoundly
connected in infinitely complex ways." 23' This is a worthy goal, but
one that more closely resembles cultural feminism than liberalism. As
cultural feminist Robin West has explained, "official" legal liberalism
is based on "the inevitability of the individual's material separation
from the 'other.'" 232 Moreover, traditional liberalism values this indi-
vidual autonomy above all else. In contrast, cultural feminists believe
that "the creation of value and the living of the good life... depend
upon relational, contextual, nuturant, and affective responses to the
needs of those who are dependent and weak."233 Dailey pictures these
two opposing viewpoints234 somehow merging into her version of "em-
227 Of course, this type of behavior is not just sexual harassment, it is also criminal
battery under most states' laws. However, it is the type of battery which is rarely
prosecuted.
228 I do not mean to imply that cultural feminism is the only school of thought which
supports a contextual approach. Obviously postmodern feminism is best suited to consid-
ering issues in context. Critics who charge all cultural feminism is essentialist, see supra
note 41 and accompanying text, would disagree with my contention that cultural feminism
supports a contextual approach to the law. However, I reject the charge of essentialism
when applied to all cultural feminism. See LindaJ. Lacey, Mimicking the Words, But Missing
the Message: The Misuse of Cultural Feminist Themes in Religion and Family Law Jurisprudence, 35
B.C. L. REv. 1, 247 (1993). Many cultural feminists' work is highly contextual. For exam-
ple, in her innovative article on tort reform, Leslie Bender advocates a contextual ap-
proach with her suggestion that persons causing an injury must help their victims. Bender,
supra note 26.
229 Dailey, supra note 209, at 1277 n.58.
230 See Gregory Bassham, Feminist Legal Theory: A Liberal Response, 6 NoTRE DAMEJ. L.
Emics & PUB. POL'Y 293 (1992). The author views feminist legal theory as presenting a
challenge to liberalism and argues, "But to pursue lasting gender equality by abandoning
the ideal of the rule of law is not only dangerous-for the rule of law is a hard-won and
essential protection for both men and women against arbitrary and oppressive state ac-
tion-but is also likely to prove self-defeating." M at 304.
231 Dailey, supra note 209, at 1283. For a critique of Dailey's approach, see Cynthia V.
Ward, A Kinder, Gentler Liberalism? Visions of Empathy in Feminist and Communitarian Litera-
ture, 61 U. Cm. L. REV. 929 (1994).
232 West, supra note 26, at 5.
233 Id. at 28.
234 Postmodern feminists would reject the dichotomy I have created, and perhaps
rightfully so. I do not mean to suggest that either version of human nature represents
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phatic liberalism," but history has taught us that "the master's tools
will never dismantle the master's house."23 5 Dominant theories (in
this case the patriarchal version of traditional liberalism) have a way of
swallowing subordinate, less popular ideas. Roiphe's book, which
combines her version of liberal feminism 23 6 with the narrative tech-
nique Dailey advocates,237 is a graphic illustration of this fact.
Most attempts to combine feminism with liberalism are not as
outrageous and dangerous as Roiphe's work.238 Nevertheless, the
popularity of The Morning After should give liberal feminists pause and
occasion to rethink the merits of their enterprise.
CONCLUSION
Many of the criticisms of cultural feminism at its height were well
deserved, but the genre contains fundamental insights which remain
valid. There are significant differences in the way many women and
men think and experience life. When we ignore these differences, we
often do so at the expense of women.239 We also perpetuate patriar-
chal values in our legal system, which is based on rewarding the male
model and undervaluing feminine traits. The popularity of Katie
Roiphe's book in the mainstream media is not surprising since it rein-
forces a liberal view of the world-a mythical gender blind, gender-
neutral world-in which rules shaped by patriarchal liberal thought
apply equally to everyone. Within the context of that world, Roiphe's
denial of the seriousness of date rape and sexual harassment has a
certain logic. Outside of the context of that world, this denial is in-
sulting, outrageous, and dangerous. But escaping from the thought
system that makes Roiphe's work ring so true for so many people is
not easy. Cultural feminism offers a means of escape, which should
not be discarded in feminism's current rush to postmodernism or a
new, improved version of liberalism.
"truth" or that they are irreconcilable. I do, however, mean to suggest that two theories
which contain these contrasting views as their central tenets cannot be merged into a single
coherent theory.
235 Audre Lorde, The Master's Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master's House, in SIs=T
Otn-siDER 110 (1984).
286 Some liberal feminists might question my categorization of Roiphe as a liberal fem-
inist, but that is clearly how she regards herself. RoiPHE, supra note 2, at 1-6, 173-74. More-
over, one of the major works of liberal feminism cites Roiphe with obvious approval.
Strossen, supra note 122.
237 Roiphe's book does not entirely follow Dailey's suggested techniques. Certainly no
one could accuse Roiphe of having even an ounce of empathy for people who disagree
with her world view.
238 I am not as unsympathetic to most of Dailey's ideas as I may sound. I agree with
much of her article, especially its emphasis on the importance of empathy.
239 For example, gender-neutral proposals for divorce reform may disadvantage wo-
men. See LindaJ. Lacey, Mandatoy Marriage 'Tor the Sake of the Children": A Feminist Reply to
Elizabeth Scot 66 TuL L. REv. 1435 (1993).
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The liberal feminist Wendy Williams describes her feelings about
Carol Gilligan's "Amy," who has become a symbol of .cultural
feminism:240
Amy has been important to me; I embrace her, but I am suspicious
of her.... I know her well enough to know that part of who she is
derives from what subordinates and oppresses her. She, with her
considerable virtues, is without a doubt the woman gender ideology
wants us to be.2 41
In many ways, I feel the same way about Katie Roiphe. She is the
woman that the liberal feminism of the seventies taught me to want to
be. I admire her toughness and her independence, but I am suspi-
cious of her. I see these new "do-me" feminists with their feeling of
invulnerability, and I feel sad. They are so confident, so sure, and
ultimately, so vulnerable. Whether they understand this or not, they
are also the women that dominant gender ideology wants us to be.
Not the gender ideology of Jesse Helms, but the gender ideology of
Hugh Hefner. Roiphe's "babe" feminist, who revels in fun sex, is ex-
actly the stereotype that Playboy has promoted for so long. Validating
objectification of women and patriarchal models of sex should not be
the ultimate goal of feminism.
I am also deeply suspicious of Roiphe's lonely vision of women as
people who must avoid group identity and group activity at all cost. In
describing the life of the first Native American attorney, a man who
ran from his roots all his life, Rennard Strickland eloquently
concludes:
Until we understand that our story is not an isolated one, we will all
continue to be like Yellow Bird, who observed... 'I was a stranger
in a strange land... looking at the multitude that thronged the
streets, and passing each other without a friendly sign, or look of
recognition even, I began to think I was in a... world, where all
were strangers and none cared to know.' Until all of us acknowl-
edge that our songs-our stories-are very much the same, we will
continue, like Yellow Bird's harpist, to play on broken strings.242
Perhaps Katie Roiphe will live out her sheltered life playing on broken
strings, without ever understanding the strength and joy that come
from a common purpose and sharing of experiences and feelings. If
she does, she will have missed so much.
240 Gilligan's most quoted study was of two 10-year olds,Jake and Amy, who were asked
a hypothetical question about whether a man should steal a drug to save his dying wife.
Jake's answer was hierarchial; Amy's answer was more contextual and concerned about
consequences-she was concerned that if the man stole the drug, then he might have to
go to prison. GILLIGAN, supra note 25, at 25-39.
241 Wendy W. Williams, Notes From a First Generation, 1989 U. CHi. LEGAL F. 99, 107
(footnotes omitted).
242 Rennard Strickland, Yellow Bird's Song: The Message of America's First Native American
Attorney, 29 TULSA UJ. 247, 262 (1994).
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